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This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect test-
ing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products
aretestedthehigherqualityproductismorelikelytopassthanthelowerqual-
ity one.When only one certifier with such testing technology is present in the
market, it is found that this monopoly certifier can be completely ignored in
equilibrium,in contrast to the prediction of a model with perfect testing tech-
nology. A separating equilibrium is also supported in which only relatively
high quality types (products) choose to pay for the certification service. It is
true that in such an equilibrium having a certificate is better than not.The ex-
act value of a certificate, however, depends both on the prior distribution of
product quality and the nature of the testing technology. Welfare accounting
shows that the monopolistic certifier’s profit maximizing conduct can lead to
under or over supply of certification service depending on model specifica-
tion.Optimalcertificationfeeisalwayspositiveandsuchthatitmakesallposi-
tive types choose to test.In the case of two competing certifiers with identical
testing technologies,the intuition of Bertrand competition does not necessar-
ily hold. Segmentation equilibrium in which higher seller types choose the
more expensive certification service and not so high types choose the less ex-
pensive service can be supported.As an application,we argue that the fee dif-
ferentiation between major and non-major auditing firms need not be a result
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Consider a market in which sellers know more about product quality than buyers do
as in Akerlof (1970). It is well understood that serious consequences including mar-
ket breakdown may result from information asymmetry in this fashion. Other than
building up reputation (Klein and Leﬄer, 1981) and providing warranty (Grossman,
1981), sellers sometimes resort to third-party intermediaries. This paper studies such
markets featuring one type of pure information intermediaries known as certiﬁers.1
By using a testing technology certiﬁers normally are able to assess the quality of
tested products. After the assessment, a certiﬁer decides whether to grant the tested
product a certiﬁcate. With the additional information of a product’s certiﬁcation
status, buyers should then know more about its quality. Examples of such certi-
ﬁcation services are numerous. Laboratories test and certify consumer products;
credit rating agencies assign credit ratings to issuers of debt obligations; universities
issue diploma to students who meet their graduation criteria; educational testing ser-
vices carry out tests evaluating testees’ scholastic aptitudes;2 many software solution
companies also run certiﬁcation programs of technical expertise through which job
applicants can obtain relevant credentials.3
In studies of certiﬁcation markets, more signiﬁcantly so in those with strategic certi-
ﬁers, it is often assumed that a perfect testing technology is available to the certiﬁers.
That is, they are able to know the exact quality of each tested product without a
single mistake. Though this simpliﬁcation is helpful to many other research topics,
it is of both practical and theoretical interest to see how certiﬁers set prices and
how markets perform when testing technologies are imperfect. Justiﬁcations for im-
perfectness in testing technologies are as many as the applications. Laboratories
make honest mistakes in certifying consumer products; credit rating agencies only
have imperfect knowledge about debt issuers’ credit worthiness; there are cases that
students fail to graduate because of non-productivity related factors; and luck plays
a role in any expertise certiﬁcation process. Yet, real life experiences indicate that
those certiﬁcation services are helpful in reducing information asymmetry. For ex-
ample, an university degree usually is a good signal of a worker’s ability although
some students may have obtained their degrees just out of luck and some high ability
students failed to graduate.
1Intermediaries who buy and sell products may also improve buyers’ information on product
quality. This point is studied in Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman (1994).
2The Educational Testing Service (ETS) is, of course, one of such institutions.
3Currently Microsoft runs four such certiﬁcation programs: Microsoft Certiﬁed Technology Spe-
cialist (MCTS), Professional Developer (MCPD), IT Professional (MCITP) and Architect (MAC).
Many other software companies such as Sun, Cisco, Oracle, etc., provide their own certiﬁcation
service.
4Many certiﬁcation services are imperfect but eﬀective in diﬀerentiating products of
diﬀerent qualities. This paper attempts to model such certiﬁcation technologies in
a general way. Our main assumption is the following: tested by such a technology,
a product may or may not pass but for any two products the higher quality one has
a higher probability than the lower quality one to pass. In the context of education,
it amounts to say that a student may or may not graduate from a university but for
any two students the one of the higher ability is more likely to succeed in earning
a diploma than the other. As shown in the following, when utilized, such a testing
technology is suﬃcient to render a certiﬁcation service informative although only to
a limited extent.
1.1 Main results
The deviation from perfect certiﬁcation generates new results. For example, a
monopoly certiﬁer with an imperfect technology can now be completely ignored,
in contrast to the prediction of a model with perfect testing technology. A certiﬁ-
cate is informative in a separating equilibrium in which only relatively high quality
types (products) choose to pay for the certiﬁcation service. Though having a cer-
tiﬁcate is preferable, the exact value of a certiﬁcate depends both on the product
quality distribution and the nature of the testing technology. Welfare accounting
shows that the monopolistic certiﬁer’s proﬁt maximizing conduct can lead to under
or over supply of certiﬁcation service depending on model speciﬁcation. Optimal
certiﬁcation fee is always positive and such that it makes all positive types choose
to test.
In the duopoly case, the intuition of Bertrand competition between two identical
suppliers (of certiﬁcates) need not hold. Facing two certiﬁers with identical but im-
perfect testing technologies, higher seller types may choose the certiﬁer who charges
the higher fee and not so high types choose the other. In such a segmentation equi-
librium, neither the lower fee certiﬁer nor the higher fee one monopolizes the entire
market of testing. Moreover, lowering one’s certiﬁcation fee does not necessarily
generate a higher demand nor a higher proﬁt. This observation suggests the possi-
bility of positive proﬁts for both certiﬁers even when their testing technologies are
essentially identical. Consequently, competition need not drive the certiﬁcation fee
to zero which would be the case if both certiﬁers had perfect testing technologies (see
Lizzeri 1999). Applied to the case of ﬁnancial auditing services, we cannot rule out
the possibility that auditors charging vastly diﬀerent fees may have similar auditing
abilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature
5and section 3 sets up the model. Section 4, 5 and 6 investigate the monopoly case
and section 7 the duopoly case. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Related literature
There are a few studies of strategic certiﬁers, but mostly with perfect testing tech-
nologies. Lizzeri (1999) builds up a canonical model of certiﬁers upon which our
model is constructed. In that paper the model is used to study certiﬁers’ strategic
behavior in information revelation assuming that they are able to know the ex-
act value of every tested product’s quality. Based on a similar model, Albano and
Lizzeri (2001) investigate sellers’ incentive in quality provision when the possibility
of certiﬁcation is available and the certiﬁer may reveal the quality information in
a strategic way. Strausz (2005) studies another important aspect of certiﬁcation
service, namely the credibility of certiﬁers. Our paper on the other hand, focuses
on certiﬁer’s testing technology. We propose a general representation of imperfect
testing technology that only requires a few basic assumptions. By constructing our
model on Lizzeri (1999)’s perfect testing model, we’ll be able to do a direct compar-
ison of respective results and highlight the implication of imperfectness in testing
technologies.4
Imperfect testing technology is studied in some other papers of certiﬁcation markets.
In this strand of literature, however, certiﬁers do not strategically set their prices
and there are normally only two possible levels of product quality, either high or low.
These papers include, for example, Heinkel (1981), De and Nabar (1991), and Mason
and Sterbenz (1994). Heinkel (1981) investigates sellers’ incentive in improving
product quality in a setup with exogenously provided imperfect tests. Mason and
Sterbenz (1994) analyze how imperfect test aﬀects market size. Compared to De
and Nabar’s (1991) paper, which like ours also studies the equilibria of certiﬁcation
markets with imperfect testing technologies, we introduce strategic certiﬁers and
allow product quality to be drawn from a continuous interval. A shortcoming of
limiting quality space to a binary set in modeling imperfect certiﬁcation is that
in an information-revealing separating equilibrium the testing technology becomes
“perfect”.
Hvide (2005) models strategic certiﬁers and introduces a zero-mean, normally dis-
tributed error term into testing technology. When a product is tested by this tech-
nology, a certiﬁer observes the sum of its true quality and the realization of a white
4It has to be noted that in this paper we are mainly interested in testing technologies. We do
not model certiﬁer’s strategic behavior in information revelation.
6noise. If this reading exceeds the certiﬁer’s passing score, the tested product will be
awarded a certiﬁcate. Modeled in this way, as it is in Hvide (2005), for any given
passing score such a technology exhibits the property of our approach, namely, the
higher the tested product quality is, the more likely it passes. This “measurement
error” approach hence amounts to a special case of our modeling of imperfect testing
technology.5
In a setting of rating agencies, Boom (2001) assumes an investment project’s proba-
bility of getting a favorable rating is the same as its success probability.6 With this
rating technology, she shows that in a market with a monopolistic rating agency
there can be over or under supply of rating services compared to the socially opti-
mal level. Though diﬀering in details, our paper shows that both market provision
and socially optimal level of certiﬁcation service depend on product quality distribu-
tion and the testing technology; we also establish a necessary condition for market
equilibrium to be socially optimal and show that when this condition is not satisﬁed
market either undersupplies or oversupplies certiﬁcation service depending on model
speciﬁcation.
To explain the signiﬁcant fee diﬀerentiation between major and non-major auditing
ﬁrms in ﬁnancial service market, Hvide (2005) argues major auditing ﬁrms adopt
stricter test standards (higher passing scores in the “measurement error” approach)
than non-major auditing ﬁrms. With the help of the stricter standards, major
auditing ﬁrms are then able to charge higher auditing fees and make higher proﬁts. In
this paper we provide an alternative explanation. In our model, we need not assume
diﬀerences in their auditing processes. Even with identical standards, i.e., identical
tests, Bertrand Competition need not happen and segmentation equilibrium may be
supported in which ﬁrms charge diﬀerent prices.
3 The model
Following the setup of Lizzeri (1999), we analyze the market situation as a non-
cooperative game with incomplete information.
5Note that the reading gives the expected quality of the tested product. The certiﬁers have
incentive to reveal more information than just the certiﬁcate. For instance, revealing the reading
itself can attract testees. In our current model, however, this information is not available to the
certiﬁers.
6It will become clear in the following that this is also a special case of our modeling of imperfect
testing technology, namely G(t)=t. See Equation (1) in Section 3.
73.1 Players
We have four players in the model, one seller, one certiﬁer and two buyers.
The seller wants to sell a product to the buyers. The product has a value equal
to its quality t (type) to both of the buyers but is worth nothing to the seller and
the certiﬁer. The type t is originally only known to the seller; the buyers and
the certiﬁer, however, know the prior distribution of t represented by cumulative
distribution function, F(t).F (t) is assumed to be continuous, diﬀerentiable and
strictly increasing on interval [a,b], where a<0 <b .7 The associated density
function is denoted f(t). The seller has the possibility to get the product tested by
the certiﬁer.
The certiﬁer has a testing technology. When it is used to test the product, it
prints out a certiﬁcate (C) with probability
Pr(C | t)=G(t), (1)
conditional on t. G(t) is also assumed to be continuous, diﬀerentiable and strictly
increasing on [a,b] with ﬁrst derivative denoted g(t). Tested by this technology,
the higher a product’s quality is the higher its probability of receiving a certiﬁcate
will be. Naturally the probability of no certiﬁcate (NC) is Pr(NC | t)=1− G(t).
This setup requires function G(t) to be bounded below by 0 and above by 1. For
convenience, we assume G(a)=0a n dG(b) = 1, i.e., it is not possible for the
lowest type to pass the test while the highest type always passes when tested.8 It is
also assumed that the certiﬁer does not manipulate the test result produced by the
technology. The certiﬁer can charge a certiﬁcation fee P for the test and the cost
associated with testing is normalized to zero.
Both buyers observe whether a product possesses a certiﬁcate or not and bid
simultaneously based on their beliefs. They, however, cannot distinguish the event
that the product was not tested from the event that the product failed the test.
That is, they observe if a product has a certiﬁcate, θ : θ ∈{ C,NC}, but not what
the seller did.
3.2 Timing
Stage 1 The certiﬁer announces its certiﬁcation fee, P, for the test.
Stage 2 At the beginning, the seller learns his type t (chosen by nature according
7When product quality is negative, consumption of such goods harms the buyers.
8This assumption does not change our results qualitatively.
8to F(·)) and the announced certiﬁcation fee, P; the seller then decides whether
or not to get the product tested by paying the certiﬁer the certiﬁcation fee.
Stage 3 If the seller chooses to test, then the certiﬁer employs the testing tech-
nology and the seller receives a certiﬁcate with probability G(t), receives no
certiﬁcate with probability 1 − G(t).
Stage 4 Both buyers observe P and if the product has a certiﬁcate or not.
Stage 5 Buyers bid independently and simultaneously for the product. The prod-
uct is sold to the buyer who bids higher than the other at the price of the
winning bid. Buyers get the product equally likely in case of a tie. When both
bids are zero, the product is not sold.
3.3 Strategies
The certiﬁer’s strategy is simply the choice of certiﬁcation fee, P ∈ R+.
The seller’s strategy speciﬁes his decision for all combinations of own quality type
and certiﬁcation fee level. Namely, it is a function ρ(P,t), from R+ × [a,b]t o
{TS,NTS}, that maps the vector (P,t) into a set of two elements, to test or
not to test.
A strategy for a buyer is a function β(P,θ), from R+ ×{C,NC} to R+, that maps
the announced certiﬁcation fee and the product’s certiﬁcation status to a bid
for that product. Buyers’ beliefs are denoted by µ(t | C,P) for a certiﬁed
product and µ(t | NC,P) for a non-certiﬁed product. Since buyers have
identical information, when beliefs are Bayesian updatable they are identical.
Note that competition will make them both bid up to their common belief.
Therefore, no subscripts are used for individual buyers.
3.4 Payoﬀs
All players are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence, they maximize their payoﬀs in
expected terms.





t − β(P,NC) when the buyer gets a non-certiﬁed product,
t − β(P,C) when the buyer gets a certiﬁed product,
0 when the buyer does not get the product.
9The seller receives buyers’ bids for a non-certiﬁed product when the product is
not tested. If the seller chooses to test, he has a probability of G(t) getting
a certiﬁcate and receiving buyers’ bids for a certiﬁed product. In other cases
(1 − G(t)), he does not get the certiﬁcate and receives bids for a non-certiﬁed
product. Taking the certiﬁcation fee into account, the seller’s payoﬀ is
V (ρ,t,P,β)=
 
β(P,NC) not to test,
[1 − G(t)]β(P,NC)+G(t)β(P,C) − P to test.
The certiﬁer’s payoﬀ is the product of the certiﬁcation fee and the demand for





dF(t), where T = {t | ρ(P,t)=TS}.
3.5 Equilibrium notion
The equilibrium notion employed in this paper is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. As
we argued before competition between the buyers will force them bid identically up
to their common belief, we have
β∗(P,θ)=
 
µ(t | θ,P)i f µ(t | θ,P) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(2)
Bayesian perfectness requires their expectations should be consistent with equilib-
rium outcome. Hence, for both buyers, when their beliefs are Bayesian updatable,
µ(t | θ,P)=E(t | θ,P),∀θ ∈{ C,NC},∀P ∈ R+, (3)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator. We also need that the seller not
to have incentive in deviating from equilibrium strategy after knowing his quality
type. The seller’s strategy choice should be, for each type, his best response to the
announced certiﬁcation fee and buyers’ biding strategies. Therefore, for any given
combination of certiﬁcation fee P and buyers bidding function β, we need
V (ρ∗,t,P,β) ≥ V (ρ ,t,P,β),∀t ∈ [a,b], where ρ  = {TS,NTS}\{ ρ∗}. (4)









10Formally we deﬁne the equilibrium notion as the following.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle {P∗,ρ ∗(P,t),β∗(P,θ)} and buyers’ belief µ(t | θ,P),
constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game, if and only if conditions (2),
(3), (4) and (5) hold.
3.6 Discussion
The testing technology (1) essentially only requires whenever two products get
tested, the product that is of the higher quality has a higher probability than the
other to pass. It doesn’t specify any functional form.
4 Monopoly: bypassing
In the situation depicted in section 3, without certiﬁcation service information asym-
metry leads to market breakdown when the prior expectation of product quality is
below zero, E(t) < 0. When E(t) > 0, however, the product is traded with prob-
ability one. From social welfare point of view, there is over-trading since there are
cases trading results in a loss to the society.9
With perfect testing technology, for example, as in Lizzeri (1999), it is found that
a monopoly certiﬁer will only certify non-negative seller types; hence, only those
certiﬁed types will be traded in equilibrium. This is an eﬃcient outcome since all
positive types are traded while none of the negative types will be. It is also shown
that the mere existence of this perfect testing possibility grants the certiﬁer the
power to take away the entire market surplus leaving the seller a payoﬀ of zero.
Consequently, the monopolist’s interest is coincident with social welfare.10 This
explains why the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing conduct is also socially optimal.
When the testing technology is imperfect, however, the game changes dramatically
with respect to both the monopoly certiﬁer’s power and the market outcome. Al-
though with perfect testing technology the certiﬁer can always guarantee itself the
demand for certiﬁcation service by oﬀering to the seller that it will reveal the exact
quality type of a tested product, when testing technology is imperfect the certiﬁer
may even be completely bypassed.
Proposition 1. Any of the following strategy proﬁles, such that,
9The lowest type a is assumed to be less than 0. Therefore, some negative types will be traded.
When a ≥ 0, full trading is eﬃcient.
10Note that buyers always end up with zero payoﬀ because they engage in Bertrand bidding
competition.
111. for all levels of the certiﬁcation fee, all seller types choose not to test,
2. for all levels of certiﬁcation fee, buyers bid for a non-certiﬁed product either
the ex ante expected quality when it is positive or zero when non-positive, bid
for a certiﬁed product either the belief for a certiﬁed product when it is positive
or zero when non-positive,
3. the certiﬁer charges any non-negative fee,
4. and the buyers’ belief being that the quality of a certiﬁed product is no higher
than the ex ante expected quality,
constitutes an equilibrium. That is,
P∗ = P ∈ R+
ρ∗(P,t)=NTS, ∀t ∈ [a,b], ∀P ∈ R+
β∗(P,NC)=m a x {E(t),0}, ∀P ∈ R+
β∗(P,C)=m a x {µ(t | C,P),0}, ∀P ∈ R+
µ(t | NC,P)=E(t), ∀P ∈ R+
µ(t | C,P)=µ ∈ (a,E(t)], ∀P ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix.
One direct implication of Proposition 1 is the following remark.
Remark 1. When testing technology is imperfect, it’s possible for the seller to bypass
the monopoly certiﬁer.
The main underlying reason for this result is the strictly positive probability that
lower types may pass the test. This leaves the buyers the scope of forming the
beliefs that are required for the equilibria in Proposition 1. In the perfect testing
technology case, such beliefs cannot be supported; consequently, bypassing is not
possible.
This diﬀerence between perfect and imperfect testing technology is not only of the-
oretical interest but also of practical importance. Consider “a” seller in the literal
sense. Before nature’s draw, there are collective interests among seller types. We
can think of a monopoly seller or an industry in aggregation. From this perspec-
tive, when E(t) ≤ 0, it is not in the seller’s interest to bypass the certiﬁcation
service because there would then be no trading. When E(t) > 0, however, the seller
12makes maximal proﬁt E(t) without the certiﬁcation service. Given that the testing
technology is imperfect, it’s at least possible for the seller to bypass the certiﬁer.
We are aware that buyers’ belief in Proposition 1 seems irregular. It essentially says
that a certiﬁcate does not serve a signal of high quality even though buyers know
that when tested higher types are more likely to obtain a certiﬁcate than lower
types. First of all, when the certiﬁcation service is not used, the beliefs stated in
Proposition 1 are not exactly irrational. Second, the reason we present Proposition 1
in this paper is to show the diﬀerence in feasible equilibria when testing technology
is perfect versus when it is imperfect. Although we can put more restrictions on
buyers’ beliefs by adopting other equilibrium notions, this possibility result signiﬁes
the decrease of certiﬁer’s power caused by imperfectness in testing technology.
5 Monopoly: separating equilibrium
In the following we search out those equilibria in which there is a positive measure
of seller types paying for the test. This is of particularly importance when E(t) ≤ 0
since in this case the market would break down if there were no certiﬁcation service
available. To focus on this issue and to simplify the analysis, we assume the prior
expected product quality to be negative.11
Assumption. The prior expected product quality is less than zero, i.e., E(t) ≤ 0.
As an example, consider the labor market for IT specialists. If there are no other
signals available and the average potential worker does not qualify, then a certiﬁcate
for such expertise would be crucial both to job applicants and to employers. Yet,
we need to ﬁnd out for a given imperfect testing technology what a certiﬁcate could
mean and how the market for the certiﬁcation service performs.
We solve the game by investigating ﬁrst the subgames induced by diﬀerent certiﬁ-
cation fees. Not surprisingly, when the certiﬁcation fee is set too high, it does not
pay for the seller to get the product tested. The following proposition states.
Proposition 2. In subgames induced by the certiﬁer’s fee setting P, it is true that:
1. if the certiﬁer charges a fee higher than the highest type, then any strategy
proﬁle such that all seller types choosing not to test, buyers bidding zero for a
non-certiﬁed, bidding for a certiﬁed product the belief for such a product when it
is positive or zero when non-positive, and buyers’ beliefs for a certiﬁed product
11Again, this assumption does not change the result on separating equilibrium qualitatively.
13being no higher than b, constitutes an equilibrium in the subgame induced by
P; that is, in subgames where P>b ,
ρ∗(t | P>b )=NTS, ∀t ∈ [a,b]
β∗(NC | P>b )=0
β∗(C | P>b )=m a x {µ(t | C,P > b),0}
µ(t | NC,P >b)=E(t)
µ(t | C,P > b)=µ ∈ (a,b];
2. if the certiﬁer charges a fee equal to the highest type, there is only one equi-
librium in the subgame other than bypassing, in which only the highest seller
type chooses to test and buyers bid the value of the highest type for a certiﬁed
product, zero for a non-certiﬁed product and buyers’ beliefs being the ex ante
expectation for a non-certiﬁed product and b for a certiﬁed product; that is, in
the subgame where P = b,
ρ∗(t = b | P = b)=TS and ρ∗(t | P = b)=NTS, ∀t ∈ [a,b)
β∗(C | P = b)=b and β∗(NC | P = b)=0
µ(C | P = b)=b and µ(NC | P = b)=E(t).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result can be interpreted as the following. When the price for test is too high,
there is intuitively not much demand for it. As a preparation for solving the whole
game, we establish the following corollary with respect to the certiﬁer’s proﬁt. The
result is immediate from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. The certiﬁer makes zero proﬁt by setting P ≥ b,o rP =0 .
5.1 Separating equilibrium
We now turn to the more interesting subgames induced by intermediate certiﬁcation








for a ≤ m<n≤ b.
14Function Ω(m,n) gives type expectation of a product with a certiﬁcate if and only if
all types from the interval (m,n] (or (m,n), [m,n), [m,n]) choose to test.
Further we introduce the following tie-breaking rule.
Assumption. When a seller type is indiﬀerent between to test and not to test, we
assume he chooses to test.
Proposition 3 (Separating). In each subgame induced by 0 <P<b , there is a
unique subgame equilibrium other than bypassing the certiﬁer completely. Moreover,
the set of seller types, which strictly prefer testing, is of the form (x,b] and type x is
indiﬀerent between testing and not testing, where x solves G(x)Ω(x,b)=P. Buyers




ρ∗(t | P)=TS,∀t ∈ [x,b],
ρ∗(t | P)=NTS,∀t ∈ [a,x),
buyer’s strategies:
 
β∗(C | P)=Ω ( x,b),
β∗(NC | P)=0 ,
and buyer’s expectation:
 
µ(t,C | P)=Ω ( x,b),
µ(t,NC | P) < 0.
constitute the equilibrium in the subgame induced by P ∈ (0,b).
Proof. See Appendix.
This result states that for each positive certiﬁcation fee that is less than the highest
quality type, there is a unique subgame equilibrium in which those relatively high
types choose to test by paying the certiﬁcation fee while relatively low types choose
not to.12 Since only those higher types choose to test, after taking the imperfectness
in the testing technology into account, buyers still bid more for a product that has a
certiﬁcate. This bidding diﬀerence justiﬁes the fee that high seller types pay for the
test. The probability of a type passing the test is critical to the type’s willingness
to pay. Even high types have a certain probability failing a test. But the nature of
the testing technology ensures that in expected terms higher types are better oﬀ by
paying for the test while lower types are better oﬀ by choosing not to test.
For ease of exposition and motivated by the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.3,
we introduce the next deﬁnition.
12Note that bypassing is still possible but in this section we focus on the cases when the certiﬁ-
cation service is used.
15Deﬁnition 3. Denote κ(P)=x such that G(x)Ω(x,b)=P where 0 <P<b .For
a given P, κ(P) gives the unique type who is indiﬀerent between to test and not to
test in the equilibrium identiﬁed in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 states that in equilibrium all types higher than κ(P) prefer paying for
the test and playing the certiﬁcation lottery over not to test. The diﬀerence for any
type t between these two options can be represented by function Γ(t), 13
Γ(t)=G(t)Ω(κ(P),b) − P.
While Γ(κ(P) )=0 ,
Γ(t | t>κ (P)) = G(t | t>κ (P))Ω(κ(P),b) − P
>G (κ(P))Ω(κ(P),b) − P =Γ ( κ(P) )=0 .
This explains that the set of the seller types who pay for the test is always connected.
Whenever a certain type ﬁnds it worthwhile paying for the test, any type above
would ﬁnd it so as well. For the same fee, a higher type gets a better lottery than
a lower type. On the other hand, this guarantees the existence of the separating
equilibrium by preventing lower types from applying the test. A certiﬁcation service
provides a device by which relatively high seller types can separate themselves from
relatively low types. They also need to pool together to induce buyers to form
a quality expectation that is positive. In the case of perfect testing technology,
however, pooling is not necessarily needed since a certiﬁer can certify a seller’s true
type. From the perspective of the seller, we have the following remark.
Remark 2. 1. When there is no testing technology, seller types’ interests are all
pooled together without choice;
2. when there is a perfect testing technology, an individual seller type has the
opportunity to perfectly identify itself unilaterally;
3. when there is an imperfect testing technology, seller types depend on each other
to a certain degree.
Recall that in the case of perfect testing technology the certiﬁer is able to make all
tested types indiﬀerent between testing and not testing and take away the entire
market surplus. The certiﬁer chooses a minimum quality standard, say κ  =0 ,
and charges P  = E(t | t ≥ 0) for the test. It turns out that types above 0 are
all indiﬀerent between testing and not testing. Note that even though each seller
13See also Equation (17) in A.3.
16type is left with zero surplus, this is the unique equilibrium when perfect testing
technology is available in the monopoly certiﬁer case.14
Suppose that a certiﬁer with an imperfect technology wants to employ such a strat-
egy. The certiﬁer claims that all types higher than κ  will pass the test while all
types below will not. Since the certiﬁer is unable to make sure that every low type
does not pass and every high type passes, the expected quality of a certiﬁed product
is not assured to be at E(t | t ≥ κ ). Therefore, buyers will not bid as much as
E(t | t ≥ κ ) and neither will the seller types pay as much for the test. So it is clear
that when testing technology is imperfect, a monopoly certiﬁer cannot take away the
entire market surplus. Indeed most of the testing seller types derive strictly positive
payoﬀ in a separating equilibrium. The following remark summaries.
Remark 3. When imperfect certiﬁcation service is used in equilibrium, the monopoly
certiﬁer’s power in taking up market surplus against the seller is limited compared
to the case in which a perfect testing technology is available.
5.2 Value of a certiﬁcate
It is worth noting how buyers form their expectations towards a certiﬁed product.
Without equilibrium analysis a certiﬁcate does not give a deﬁnitive meaning in terms
of product quality. Proposition 3, however, says only types higher than or equal to
κ(P) go to the certiﬁer in equilibrium at the cost of a positive fee. By successfully at-
tracting a positive measure of seller types, the certiﬁcation service practically blocks
away types lower than κ(P) in the original population and ﬁlters the remaining into




κ(P) G(t)dF(t) where f(t) is the density function of the original






First, this observation further emphasizes the idea that buyers are only able to
attribute a value to a certiﬁcate for equilibrium outcomes but not for oﬀ-equilibrium
incidences. Second, in an equilibrium of the form stated in Proposition 3, the value
of a certiﬁcate directly depends both on the population of the seller types who choose
to test and on the nature of the testing technology. This implies that to be able
14For a formal reasoning, the reader is referred to Lizzeri (1999). This situation resembles the
observation that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a 2-player Ultimatum game, the
proposer gets all and the other gets nothing even though she can reject.
17to assess a certiﬁcate, a buyer ﬁrst needs to understand what types of products are
likely to choose to test and how diﬃcult it is to pass such a test. Third, note that the
value of the certiﬁcate Ω(κ(P),b) for a given type distribution and a given testing
technology is a function of the certiﬁcation fee P. Hence, when the certiﬁcation fee
changes, the value of the certiﬁcate also changes.
Compared to the case in which a perfect testing technology is available, the depen-
dence on the test takers’ population is crucial in imperfect testing. In the former
case, a certiﬁer can always identify the type when a product is tested. The meaning
of such a test can be made independent of the seller’s type distribution. In our
imperfect testing case, the certiﬁer has to rely on a positive measure of seller types
to make the certiﬁcate meaningful. This dependence is responsible for the limited
ability of the certiﬁer both in ensuring demand for the test (Remark 1) and in taking
up market surplus against the seller (Remark 3).
5.3 Free certiﬁcation
There is one subgame yet to be discussed, the one induced by P =0 . It is of
additional importance because we are also interested in the case when tests are
provided for free to the seller, for instance, through a public policy program.
Proposition 4. In the subgame induced by P =0 , buyers make positive bids for a
certiﬁed product if and only if Ω(a,b) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Free certiﬁcation produces two contrasting outcomes with respect to trading prob-
abilities. It gives the maximum probability of
  b
a G(t)dF(t) when Ω(a,b) > 0 since
all seller types have already chosen to test and there is no other way to increase the
probability of having a certiﬁed product. If Ω(a,b) < 0, the product will for sure
not be traded. However, neither of these two is necessarily desirable compared to
the socially optimal level discussed in subsection 6.3 below.
6 Monopoly: market performance
6.1 Equilibrium of the game
After having investigated all subgames, we are now ready to solve the game in its
entirety. At the ﬁrst stage, the certiﬁer chooses the certiﬁcation fee for the test,
P ∈ R+. Since we put aside bypassing equilibria, the next result follows.
18Proposition 5. In equilibrium, a monopoly certiﬁer sets P to maximize proﬁt
Π(P)=P[1 − F(κ(P))]. That is,
P∗ = arg max
P∈(0,b)
P[1 − F(κ(P))]. (6)
It can also be represented as to choose the indiﬀerent type x, such that it maximizes
the certiﬁer’s proﬁt. Formally,
x∗ = arg max
x∈(a,b)
G(x)Ω(x,b)[1 − F(x)]. (7)
Proof. See Appendix.
The monopoly certiﬁer’s trade-oﬀ resembles that of many other monopoly producers
who face a downward sloping demand curve. Demand decreases when the fee (price)
increases. The diﬀerence, however, is that while the negative slope of the demand
function of consumer products is normally a result of consumers’ descending willing-
ness to pay for the unit-by-unit-identical product, here the value of the certiﬁcate
that is being oﬀered is actually evolving along with participating seller types. The
value of a certiﬁcate deteriorates in the participation of lower seller types. When a
certiﬁer lowers its certiﬁcation fee, it lowers the value of its certiﬁcate too.
6.2 An example
To have a better understanding of the equilibrium outcome, we present a fully spec-
iﬁed numerical example.
Example 1. Suppose seller types are uniformly distributed on the interval [−2,1],
that is, F(t)=t+2
3 . The testing technology G(t) follows a power function, G(t)=
 t+2
3
 2 on [−2,1]. Under this model speciﬁcation, as stated in Equation (22), the
























The solution to this problem is x =0 .3154. This means the fee the certiﬁer charges
is


















It turns out that seller types in [0.3154,1] choose to test while the rest choose not
19to. Buyers bid















for a certiﬁed product and 0 for a non-certiﬁed. The expected proﬁt the certiﬁer
makes is













if a perfect testing technology were available.15 This point can indeed be generalized.
Remark 4. A monopoly certiﬁer with an imperfect testing technology makes a
smaller proﬁt than a monopoly certiﬁer with a perfect testing technology under oth-
erwise identical circumstances.
The explanation is the following. With perfect testing technology, a certiﬁer is able
to take away the entire trading surplus in the market leaving nothing to the seller.
Consequently, the certiﬁer will seek to reach the highest possible market surplus.
In contrast, with imperfect testing technology, the surplus generated in the product
market is shared between the certiﬁer and the seller.16 From the perspective of the
certiﬁer, with perfect testing technology it achieves ﬁrst best outcome; while in the
case of imperfect testing technology, not only the certiﬁer’s share is less than 1 but
also the total level of generated surplus can be well below maximum.
An interesting question concerns the type distribution of a certiﬁed product in equi-
librium. The type distribution of a certiﬁed product has the support of [0.3154,1].
Its density function is a transformation of part of the original density function via the
testing technology. Denote fc(t) the new probability density function of a certiﬁed


















=0 .20566(t +2 ) 2.
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the original distribution, the testing
technology and the transformed type distribution of a certiﬁed product.
15The proﬁt under perfect testing technology is found when the certiﬁer only certiﬁes types above
zero and charges E(t | t ≥ 0).
16Note that the set of seller types who strictly prefer paying for the test obtain positive expected
payoﬀs. See subsection 5.1.
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Figure 1: A case of an uniformly distributed type population (f(t)=1
3) and
a power testing technology (G(t)=
 t+2
3
 2); types to the right of the dashed
line, [0.3154,1], pay for the test in equilibrium; the curve in the upper right
represents the type density function of a certiﬁed product.
6.3 Welfare
An important issue in markets with asymmetric information is market performance
in terms of social welfare. The next result gives the condition for welfare maximiza-
tion.
Proposition 6. In the separating equilibrium of subgames induced by 0 <P<b ,
market surplus is represented by
  b
κ(P) tG(t)dF(t). It is maximized when κ(P∗∗)=0 ,
i.e., when type 0 is made indiﬀerent between testing and not testing. Therefore, the
welfare maximizing certiﬁcation fee is P∗∗ = G(0)Ω(0,b).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is the following. For a product to be traded in a separating equilibrium,
it has to obtain a certiﬁcate. Note that trading of positive types increases while
trading of negative types decreases social welfare. So the ideal outcome is that all
positive types obtain a certiﬁcate while all negative types are uncertiﬁed. But given
the nature of the imperfect testing technology, this is not achievable. Also note that
once a give type decides to test, the probability of getting a certiﬁcate is governed by
the testing technology. The second best is then to set the certiﬁcation fee to a level
such that it is low enough for all positive types to pay for the test while it is still
high enough to discourage negative types from using the test. Hence, the optimal
21certiﬁcation fee should make type 0 the indiﬀerent type. Note that G(0)Ω(0,b)i s
strictly positive, we emphasize the result as a corollary to Proposition 6.
Corollary 2. The social welfare maximizing certiﬁcation fee P∗∗ is strictly positive.
Apparently, free certiﬁcation under imperfect testing technology is not an optimal
policy. Because of the inability of the testing technology in blocking negative types
from getting a certiﬁcate, we need a positive certiﬁcation fee to function as a self-
selection mechanism.
We can also see the diﬀerence between social welfare and the certiﬁer’s proﬁt in a





Certiﬁer’s proﬁt : P[1 − F(κ(P))]















They diﬀer by the part in the curly brackets in equation (8). Note that G(t | t>
κ(P)) >G (κ(P)), the part in the curly brackets is less than 1. Hence, not all of
the total market surplus is taken by the certiﬁer. Part of it is shared by the seller.
But for a certiﬁer equipped with a perfect testing technology, G(t | t ≥ κ ) could
be set to 1 and G(t | t<κ  )t o0 . The part in the curly brackets hence vanishes
and the monopoly certiﬁer’s proﬁt is equal to the entire social surplus. When such
a certiﬁer maximizes its proﬁt it as well maximizes social welfare. This comparison
tells us that the inability of taking up all market surplus leads to a lower level of
social welfare, i.e., ineﬃciency.
Boom (2001) shows that in a market with a monopolistic rating agency there can
be over or under supply of rating services in equilibrium compared to socially op-
timal level. In the next proposition we establish the necessary condition for proﬁt
maximizing conduct to be welfare maximizing. When this condition does not hold,
market either oversupplies or undersupplies certiﬁcation service depending on model
speciﬁcation.
Proposition 7. A necessary condition for the proﬁt maximizing certiﬁer to set the











22Moreover, when P[1 − F(κ(P))] is concave for P ∈ (0,b), there is oversupply (un-











Proof. See the Appendix.
This necessary condition requires the Hazard rate of the original type distribution
when evaluated at type 0 has to be equal to the sum of a value related to the
testing technology (G(t)) and certiﬁed product’s density at type 0. When condition
(9) doesn’t hold, socially optimal certiﬁcation fee will not be achieved by proﬁt
maximizing monopoly certiﬁer.
Further, with additional information of certiﬁer’s proﬁt function concavity, we can











the ﬁrst derivative of proﬁt is positive at type 0. Therefore, the certiﬁer will have
an incentive to raise the certiﬁcation fee from the socially optimal level P∗∗ =
G(0)Ω(0,b) and the indiﬀerent type will be strictly higher than type 0. Because
there are strictly positive types ﬁnd the certiﬁcation fee too high and do not apply
the test, there is under utilization of the certiﬁcation service. Social welfare could be
improved by lowering the certiﬁcation fee. Similarly, when the reverse of condition
(11) holds, the indiﬀerent type will be strictly lower than 0 and some negative types
will be traded. Hence there will be oversupply of certiﬁcation service.
6.4 Example 1 continued
In the above numerical example, the indiﬀerent type is 0.3154. Social welfare would
be higher if types in [0,0.3154] applied the test. Hence, the certiﬁcation fee 0.4092 is
too high. By lowering the fee, more seller types will use the certiﬁcation service and
the product will have a higher probability to be traded. To be exact, the socially
optimal fee is


















So that types in [0,1] choose to test while types in [−2,0] choose not to.
23Social welfare
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 2 dt =0 .1801
Table 1: Welfare under (im)perfect testing in example 1.
In Table 1 we compare social welfare and the product’s trading probability in exam-
ple 1 under three diﬀerent scenarios: perfect testing technology, imperfect testing
technology used to maximize social welfare and imperfect testing technology used to
maximize the certiﬁer’s proﬁt. According to the original type distribution, the mean
of all positive types is 1/6 which is the entire surplus that can be generated from
trading. Since with perfect testing technology, all positive types get a certiﬁcate, the
probability of trading is 1/3. With imperfect testing technology, under welfare max-


















 2 dt =0 .1327. When
the certiﬁer maximizes proﬁt, certiﬁcation fee is higher and less types apply the







 2 dt =







 2 dt =0 .1237 which is less than the
optimal level. So the eﬃciency of the market is reduced both by the imperfectness
in testing technology and by the certiﬁer’s proﬁt maximizing conduct.17
Generally, proﬁt maximizing monopoly certiﬁer does not set the certiﬁcation fee to
the socially optimal level. But even when the service is run by the public sector and
the certiﬁcation fee is optimally set such that all positive types apply the test and all
negative types do not, ineﬃciency remains because some positive types will fail the
test and will not be traded. However, compared to the market breakdown outcome
without certiﬁcation service, there at least will be some trading in a separating
equilibrium. The next remark summarizes.
Remark 5. An imperfect testing technology solves the asymmetric information prob-
lem imperfectly. The market is not as eﬃcient as it is with perfect testing technology
but it does improve buyers’ information on product quality in equilibrium.
17Note that in perfect testing case, the certiﬁer’s proﬁt is coincident with social welfare. One may
argue the eﬃciency loss is entirely caused by testing technology imperfectness.
247 Duopoly
In this section we investigate a market with two certiﬁers. The main purpose of
this section is to provide a new perspective for the study of competing certiﬁers.
To this aim, we are interested in market behavior with given certiﬁcation fees. The
seller now can choose which certiﬁer to go for a test or not to test at all. We do
not consider the possibility that a seller type applies both tests. Hence, the seller’s
decision ρ maps R2
+ × [a,b]t o{TS1,TS 2,NTS}.T S 1 is to test at Certiﬁer 1 and
TS2 is to test at Certiﬁer 2. When a seller type fails a test, the type is pooled with
those who do not test. For buyers, β is now a function from R2
+ ×{ C1,C 2,NC} to
R+, which speciﬁes their bids for a product conditional on which certiﬁcate it has
or none at all. Here, C1 stands for a certiﬁcate from Certiﬁer 1 and C2 a certiﬁcate
from Certiﬁer 2. As a tie-breaking rule, in the analysis of equilibrium strategies,
when a seller type is indiﬀerent between two options, he makes the same decision as
the type slightly higher than he is.
7.1 Segmentation in identical tests
We consider a case in which these two certiﬁers employ identical testing technolo-
gies. Formally, we have G1(t)=G2(t)=G(t) for all t ∈ [a,b]. This setup is to
say these two certiﬁers are providing identical tests and they are identical except
that they charge diﬀerent certiﬁcation fees. The next result reveals that the usual
intuition of Bertrand competition between certiﬁers need not hold. Even with dif-
ferent certiﬁcation fees, both certiﬁers can attract positive measures of seller types
in equilibrium.
Proposition 8 (Segmentation). Assume two certiﬁers charge diﬀerent certiﬁca-
tion fees and, without loss of generality, the certiﬁer who charges the higher fee is
named Certiﬁer 1 and the one charges the lower fee, Certiﬁer 2, 0 <P 2 <P 1 <b .
If there exist x1 and x2 such that a<x 2 <x 1 <band
P1 − P2 = G(x1)[Ω(x1,b) − Ω(x2,x 1)] (12)
P2 = G(x2)Ω(x2,x 1), (13)
then x1 and x2 identify a subgame equilibrium in which types in (x1,b] strictly prefer
testing at Certiﬁer 1, type x1 is indiﬀerent between testing at either of these two
certiﬁers, types in (x2,x 1) strictly prefer testing at Certiﬁer 2, type x2 is indiﬀerent
between testing at Certiﬁer 2 and not to test at all, types below x2 strictly prefer not
to test, buyers bid Ω(x1,b) for a product with Certiﬁcate 1, Ω(x2,x 1) for a product
25with Certiﬁcate 2 and 0 for a non-certiﬁed product. That is,
ρ∗(t | P1,P 2)=TS1,∀t ∈ [x1,b]
ρ∗(t | P1,P 2)=TS2,∀t ∈ [x2,x 1)
ρ∗(t | P1,P 2)=NTS,∀t ∈ [a,x2)
β∗(C1 | P1,P 2)=µ(C1 | P1,P 2)=Ω ( x1,b)
β∗(C2 | P1,P 2)=µ(C2 | P1,P 2)=Ω ( x2,x 1)
β∗(NC | P1,P 2)=0 ,µ (NC | P1,P 2) < 0.
Proof. See appendix.
When the equilibrium identiﬁed in Proposition 8 exists, for instance in our example
in subsection 7.2, we call such equilibrium segmentation equilibrium. The existence
of segmentation equilibrium suggests that it is possible for both certiﬁers to attract
positive measures of seller types while charging diﬀerent fees. Since the testing tech-
nologies are identical, they are providing supposedly identical certiﬁcation service.
One may expect that the lower fee certiﬁer takes up entire market demand for the
certiﬁcation service and competition would drive the certiﬁcation fee to marginal
cost as in normal Bertrand competition. In the current setup, this means free cer-
tiﬁcation service.18 Proposition 8, however, shows this line of reasoning need not
hold. When segmentation equilibrium exists, certiﬁers need not engage in Bertrand
competition because lowering one’s certiﬁcation fee does not necessarily increase the
demand for its certiﬁcation service nor its proﬁt. Being a higher fee certiﬁer does
not mean having zero demand either.
This result can be understood in light of the endogeneity of a certiﬁcate’s value.
(Subsection 5.2) When the certiﬁers charge diﬀerent fees, their certiﬁcates have
diﬀerent values in a segmentation equilibrium. Hence, although they have identical
testing processes, their end products (certiﬁcates) are diﬀerentiated.
In the monopoly certiﬁer case, a certiﬁcation service provides a device that higher
types can diﬀerentiate themselves from lower types by paying for the test. With two
certiﬁers providing imperfect certiﬁcation services, those really high types choose
the higher fee certiﬁer to diﬀerentiate themselves from moderate types.
Remark 6. 1. A higher certiﬁcation fee can serve as a signal of higher product
quality.
2. Even with identical imperfect testing technology, duopoly certiﬁers need not to
engage in Bertrand Competition.
18Proposition 4 ﬁnds free certiﬁcation is generally not socially optimal.
267.2 An example in Duopoly
We work through an example to verify the existence of segmentation equilibrium.





2 . The testing technology G(t) is represented by this





The type expectation function Ω(m,n) is, after simple algebra, simply m+n
2 . Equa-
tions (12) and (13) then read













2 x1 + x2
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Suppose Certiﬁer 1 charges P1 =0 .6 and Certiﬁer 2 charges P2 =0 .1. In this
case, the above system obtains a unique solution, x1 =0 .4742,x 2 = −0.1648. Seller
t y p e si n[ 0 .4742,1] choose Certiﬁer 1, types in [−0.1648,0.4742) choose Certiﬁer 2,
types in [−1,−0.1648) choose not to test. Type 0.4742 is indeed indiﬀerent be-
tween choosing either of these two certiﬁers and type −0.1648 is indiﬀerent between
choosing Certiﬁer 2 or not to test at all. Buyers in this case bid Ω(0.4742,1) =
(0.4742 + 1)/2=0 .7371 for a product with Certiﬁcate 1, bid Ω(−0.1648,0.4742) =
(−0.1648 + 0.4742)/2=0 .1547 for a product with Certiﬁcate 2 and bid zero for a
non-certiﬁed product.
The proﬁts the certiﬁers make are
Π1(P1 =0 .6,P 2 =0 .1) = P1 (1 − F(x1) )=0 .084873
and
Π2(P2 =0 .1,P 1 =0 .6) = P2 (F(x1) − F(x2)) = 0.021233.
So in this example the higher fee certiﬁer earns a higher proﬁt than the lower fee
certiﬁer.
In the perfect testing case studied in Lizzeri (1999), competition of certiﬁers will
drive the certiﬁcation fee to zero. When testing technology is imperfect, even if
both certiﬁers provide identical testing technology, the current analysis shows fee
diﬀerentiation is possible and Bertrand Competition is not guaranteed. The point is
that when certiﬁers charge diﬀerent fees, there can be subgame equilibria in which
high seller types choose the high fee certiﬁer to signal their type. Hence certiﬁers
27need not to lower their certiﬁcation fee to the marginal cost level. In example 2, each
certiﬁer has a positive proﬁt and lowering one’s certiﬁcation fee doesn’t necessarily
increase one’s demand nor proﬁt.
Remark 7. Although imperfect testing technology limits certiﬁers’ power in col-
lecting generated surplus from the seller, it does help to soften competition among
certiﬁers.
7.3 An alternative explanation to auditing fee diﬀerences
The signiﬁcant fee diﬀerentiation between major and non-major auditing ﬁrms has
long been documented in the accounting literature (e.g., Simunic (1980)). See also
more recent evidence like Hay et al. (2006).19 It is also known that in Initial Public
Oﬀerings and debt ﬁnancing, ﬁrms audited by major auditors generally receive more
favorable bids than those audited by other auditors. Evidences include Teoh and
Wong (1993) and Mansi et al. (2004) among others. The empirical observation here
is, in other words, the positive correlation between auditing fees and bids received.
DeAngelo (1981), Titman and Trueman (1986) and in a context similar to our paper,
Hvide (2005), suggest that the diﬀerences in auditors’ auditing qualities or standards
are responsible for this observation.20 Yet, as acknowledged in Hay et al. (2006), dif-
ferences in auditing qualities are hard to identify. Here we suggest a new perspective
to this question, namely identical imperfect testing technology. We show in Exam-
ple 2 that even two identical testing technologies can support fee diﬀerentiation in
equilibrium and those who choose the higher fee certiﬁer receive higher bids from the
buyers. Applied to the auditing context, those major auditing ﬁrms (Certiﬁer 1 in
Proposition 8) may have exactly the same ability in identifying audited companies’
ﬁnancial soundness as other auditing ﬁrms (Certiﬁer 2 in Proposition 8). If seg-
mentation equilibrium is supported, by paying a higher audition fee, a company of
higher quality receives higher bids in equilibrium. Audited by a non-major auditing
ﬁrm, however, signals a lower quality. Note also that moderate quality companies
will not try major auditing ﬁrms since those are too expensive and they are very
likely to get unfavorable auditing reports. They try non-major ﬁrms nevertheless
since the fee is low enough to justify their relatively small probability of getting
favorable auditing reports. To apply the above analysis, we only need to assume
that auditing processes are imperfect, that is, auditing ﬁrms are not able to know
exactly the ﬁnancial situation of each audited ﬁrm and yet are able to ensure better
companies have a higher probability receiving favorable ﬁnancial reports.
19Major auditing ﬁrms here refer to the few largest auditing ﬁrms. The exact number varies from
time to time.
20Additional references on this topic can be found in Hvide (2005).
28That major auditing ﬁrms make more proﬁts than the rest is also predicted in Ex-
ample 2. Though we have argued that diﬀerent certiﬁcation fees P1,P 2 are possible
in equilibrium, we leave solving the entire duopoly game to future research.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general model of imperfect testing technology in certiﬁ-
cation services. The main assumption of our suggested model is that whenever two
products get tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower
quality one. The model also admits continuous quality types and strategic certiﬁers.
The analysis provided in this paper aims to improve our understanding of imper-
fect certiﬁcation. It’s not always clear what a certiﬁcate means in real life. Yet,
we have seen a large number of successful certiﬁcation services that are of practi-
cal uses. This paper takes a formal theoretical approach and proves that when a
certiﬁcation service can ensure that higher quality products stand a better chance
obtaining a certiﬁcate than lower quality products, such certiﬁcation service can
reduce information asymmetry and facilitate trading.
Monopoly certiﬁers with imperfect testing technologies are not as powerful as they
would be if perfect testing technologies were available. According to the analysis, a
certiﬁer with an imperfect technology can be completely bypassed. This is in sharp
contrast to the case of perfect testing technology.
A separating equilibrium is also supported in which only high quality seller types
(products) utilize the certiﬁcation service. By paying the certiﬁcation fee a seller
type in principle obtains the right to play a lottery. The lottery, however, is type
dependent and is in favor of higher types since higher types are more likely to get
a certiﬁcate for the same certiﬁcation fee. The value of a certiﬁcate is determined
jointly by the type distribution and the nature of the testing technology. Welfare
accounting shows that the monopolistic certiﬁer’s proﬁt maximizing conduct can
lead to under or over supply of certiﬁcation service depending on model speciﬁcation.
The welfare maximizing certiﬁcation fee is always positive and such that it makes
all positive types choose to test. Hence, free certiﬁcation is not recommended under
imperfect testing technology.
When there are two certiﬁers with identical testing technologies oﬀering certiﬁca-
tion services in the market, intuition suggests Bertrand competition of the certiﬁers.
While this is true in the perfect testing case studied in Lizzeri (1999), the arguments
for Bertrand competition are not valid in imperfect testing cases. Segmentation equi-
librium in which higher seller types choose the more expensive certiﬁcation service
29and not so high types choose the less expensive service can be supported. In this
case, keeping on lowering one’s certiﬁcation fee is not necessarily the best response.
In the context of auditing industry, we show that to explain the fee diﬀerentiation
between major and non-major auditing ﬁrms we do not have to assume diﬀerences
in auditing processes.
30A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If no seller types choose to get the product tested, the type population of a
non-certiﬁed product is exactly the original one. Hence, it is optimal for the buyers
to bid max{E(t),0} for a non-certiﬁed product. As long as the buyers believe the
type of a certiﬁed product µ(t | C,P) ≤ E(t), that is, it is not above the population
mean, any bid β(P,C) = max{µ(t | C,P),0} for a certiﬁed product is one of the
best responses (Condition 2).
Because a certiﬁcate is an oﬀ-equilibrium incidence and any type except type a could
get a certiﬁcate with a strictly positive probability, buyers’ beliefs for a certiﬁed
product can be supported (Condition 3).21,22
If buyers’ bids for a certiﬁed product are no higher than those for a non-certiﬁed
product, no seller types choose to test. Note also that a single type choosing to test
does not convince the buyers to bid higher, so the seller will not pay for the test
after learning his own type (Condition 4).
Given the strategies of the seller and the buyers, the certiﬁer’s action is irrelevant
(Condition 5).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. With respect to the certiﬁcation fee P, we have the following two cases.
P>b : It is obvious that in no cases buyers will bid above b. All seller types
will make a loss by paying for the test. Since E(t) ≤ 0, buyers bid zero for
a non-certiﬁed and up to their belief for a certiﬁed product. So any of the
stated strategy pair constitutes an equilibrium in these subgames. Note that
buyers’s out of equilibrium belief a<µ (t | C,P > b) ≤ b can be supported.
P = b: Note that any combination of seller types other than type b alone choosing
to test will result buyers’ belief for a certiﬁed product being less than b, µ(t |
C) <b .In turn their bids β(C | P) <b .Choosing to test makes a loss for all
seller types in such a situation.
21Given that there is a positive probability for low types to pass, buyers’ belief are not irrational.
For perfect Bayesian equilibrium, any not exactly impossible oﬀ-equilibrium belief will do. In other
words, there is no prior to be updated.
22Here buyers can hold diﬀerent beliefs so long as they satisfy the speciﬁed conditions, i.e., their
beliefs for a non-certiﬁed product are both no higher than the ex ante type expectation.
31When type b alone chooses to test, however, we have µ(t | C)=b. Because
type b for sure gets the certiﬁcate by choosing to test, type b is indiﬀerent
between testing
β(C | P) − P = b − b =0 ,
and not testing (also 0). Types other than b has a strictly positive possibility
of getting no certiﬁcate. Consequently, if choose to test, seller types t<b
will receive a negative payoﬀ G(t)b − b<0. The only equilibrium other than
bypassing when P = b is then the one in which type b alone chooses to test
and all others not to. The buyers then bid b for a certiﬁed product and 0
for a non-certiﬁed product in this equilibrium. Since type b alone is of zero
measure, buyers’ belief for a non-certiﬁed product remains to be the product’s
prior expectation E(t) which is less than zero.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The logic of the proof is the following. First, we investigate the properties
of equilibrium strategies in subgames induced by P ∈ (0,b) with some seller types
choosing to test, when such equilibrium exists. Second, we prove the existence
by constructing strategies that fulﬁll all such properties. The uniqueness of the
equilibrium is then shown by examination of an equivalent mathematical system.
Step 1 is to show that in such equilibria buyers bid more for a certiﬁed product
and the lowest seller type does not choose to test in equilibrium.
In the subgames induced by 0 <P<b ,suppose there exist a set of seller types who
choose to test by paying the testing fee P in equilibrium. Denote such a set Ψ(P).
That is,
Ψ(P) ≡{ t | ρ∗(t | P)=TS}.
For all seller types in Ψ(P), the expected payoﬀ from testing has to be no less than
what they could get by not to test. We have, ∀t ∈ Ψ(P),
G(t)β(C | P)+( 1− G(t))β(NC | P) − P ≥ β(NC | P). (14)
After rearranging, ∀t ∈ Ψ(P),
G(t)[β(C | P) − β(NC | P)] ≥ P. (15)
32Since P>0 by assumption, ∀t ∈ Ψ(P)
G(t)[β(C | P) − β(NC | P)] > 0.
Note that ∀t ∈ [a,b],G(t) ≥ 0, so both G(t | t ∈ Ψ(P)) and β(C | P) − β(NC | P)
have to be strictly larger than zero. That is,
a/ ∈ Ψ(P) ∧ β(C | P) >β (NC | P). (16)
So we showed that when there exist a set of seller types who choose to test by paying
a strictly positive fee in equilibrium, buyers bid more for a certiﬁed product and the
lowest seller type a does not test.
Step 2 is to prove when buyers bid more for a certiﬁed product the set of seller
types that pay for the test exists and is of the form [x,b].
Let’s denote Γ(t) the diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs for type t between to test and
not to.
Γ(t) ≡ G(t)[β(C | P) − β(NC | P)] − P. (17)
Apparently, t ∈ Ψ(P) if and only if Γ(t) ≥ 0. Note that for any given P and β
such that 0 <P<band β(C | P) >β (NC | P), Γ(t) is continuous and strictly
increasing in t;Γ ( b) ≥ Γ(t) ∀t ∈ [a,b]. Hence, if any types choose to test, type b
must be one of them, b ∈ Ψ(P).
1. Suppose type b is the only element of Ψ(P), that is Ψ = {b}. From Proposition
2, β(C | P)=b and β(NC | P)=0 . Therefore, combined with G(b)=1a n d
P<b ,we have Γ(b)=G(b)b − P>0.
Solving the equation G(t)b−P =0 ,w eh a v et = G−1(P/b) where G−1 is the in-
verse of G. Because G(t) is strictly increasing, for the types t ∈ (G−1(P/b),b),
their expected payoﬀ of testing G(t)b − P is strictly larger than zero. These
types will also choose to test. Hence we prove that when 0 <P<b , the
supposition that Ψ(P) has only one element is false.
2. Now we know Ψ(P), when it exists, contains more elements than just type
b alone. Note also G(t) is strictly increasing and β(C | P) >β (NC | P).
Therefore, if a type t  other than b is in Ψ(P), that is, if the expression (15)
holds for t , it also must hold with strict inequality for any t>t  . Hence, all
t such that t>t   should be in Ψ(P) as well. Moreover, these types strictly
prefer testing. In equilibrium, the set of seller types strictly prefer testing must
be of the form (x,b]o r[ x,b] for some x<b .
333. For type b,w eh a v e
Γ(b)=G(b)[β(C | P) − β(NC | P)] − P>0.
This inequality holds strictly because type b obtains a higher payoﬀ than type
inf Ψ(P). For type a, G(a)=0 ,
Γ(a)=−P<0.
By the continuity and monotonicity of function Γ(t), there is a unique solution
for Γ(t) = 0 in the domain of (a,b). Suppose x =Γ −1(0), for type x, it is
indiﬀerent between to test and not to test. For t>x ,Γ ( t) > 0. Consequently,
when buyers bid more for a certiﬁed product the set of seller types that pay for
the test exists in each subgame induced by 0 <P<band, by the tie-breaking
rule, is of the form [x,b].
Step 3 is to construct the required buyers’ optimal bids.
In this part we search out compatible buyers’ strategies, β(·|P) that will satisfy
β(C | P) >β (NC | P) ≥ 0.
Buyers bid positively for a certiﬁed product (β(C | P) > 0), only when their beliefs
for a certiﬁed product is positive (µ(t | C) > 0). In equilibrium, µ(t | C) requires to
be consistent with rational expectation,
µ(t | C)=E(t | C).
Further, by the following identity
Pr(C)E(t | C)+( 1− Pr(C))E(t | NC) ≡ E(t) < 0, (18)
it cannot be true that both conditional expectations are non-negative. Hence, to
have E(t | C) > 0, E(t | NC) has to be less than zero. In turn, µ(t | NC) < 0 and
β(NC | P)=0 . Since the set of seller types that choose to test is of the form [x,b],






=Ω ( x,b). (19)
The bid for a certiﬁed product is, therefore, β(C | P)=E(t | C)=Ω ( x,b). To ﬁnd
34indiﬀerent type x, we need to solve
G(x)[Ω(x,b) − 0] = P.
The existence and uniqueness of the solution is established in the next step. Note
that if G(x)Ω(x,b)=P holds, then Ω(x,b)= P
G(x). Since both P and G(t),∀t ∈ (a,b]
are larger than zero, Ω(x,b) is also large than zero. Hence we constructed feasible
buyers’ strategies and their beliefs. For 0 <P<b ,buyers bid
β(C | P)=µ(t | C)=E(t | C)=Ω ( x,b)
and β(NC | P) = 0 with belief µ(t | NC) < 0. These bidding strategies are
compatible to the seller’s strategy.
Step 4 is to prove the existence and uniqueness of the indiﬀerent type x for each
0 <P<b .
The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the subgames boils down to the
existence and uniqueness of the solution to Γ(t)=0o r
G(x)Ω(x,b)=P. (20)
Note that Ω(x,b) is bounded, it is clear that
lim




Note also function Ω(x,b) and G(x)Ω(x,b) are continuous,23 G(x)Ω(x,b)=P ob-
tains at least one solution when 0 <P<b .
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x G(t)dF(t)
 2 .
It’s easy to verify that all parts in the right hand side are positive. Hence
dΩ(x,b)
dx > 0
and Ω(x,b) increases in x.
According to the value of Ω(a,b), we discuss two cases.
1. When Ω(a,b) ≥ 0, then Ω(x,b) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ (a,b]. Since the derivative of the
23The continuity of Ω(x,b) follows from the theorem that the quotient of two continuous functions
is continuous. That the divisor
  b
x G(t)dF(t) is non-zero for x ∈ (a,b) is checked.







All parts are positive and G(x)Ω(x,b) increases monotonically form 0 to b.
Hence Equation 20 only obtains one solution when 0 <P<b .
2. When Ω(a,b) < 0, because of continuity and monotonicity of Ω(x,b), we ﬁrst
ﬁnd x such that Ω(x,b) = 0. For any x<x, Ω(x,b) < 0 hence Equation (20)
has no solution. Within the interval of [x,b], G(x)Ω(x,b) increases monotoni-
cally form 0 to b. Hence Equation (20) only obtains one solution in [x,b] when
0 <P<b .
This proves the existence and uniqueness of the indiﬀerent type x for each 0 <P<b .
Together with above steps, all conditions required by equilibrium notion (Deﬁnition
1) for the subgames are satisﬁed and we have established uniqueness.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. 1. If Ω(a,b) > 0, it’s easy to verify that all types choose to test and buyers
bid Ω(a,b) for a certiﬁed product and zero for a non-certiﬁed product is an
equilibrium.
2. On the other hand, if buyers make positive bids for a certiﬁed product, all types
above a will choose to test. This is because there is simply no cost involved
in testing for the seller and there is a certain probability receiving positive
bids. Hence, to test is the dominant strategy except for the lowest type.
Suppose Ω(a,b) ≤ 0, then buyers’ belief for a certiﬁed product is non-positive
and consequently will bid zero for a certiﬁed product. This contradicts the
supposition that buyers make positive bids. Hence when buyers make positive
bids, Ω(a,b) > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. According to Corollary 1, if P ≥ b or P = 0 the seller’s proﬁt will be zero.
Note as well that according to the proof of the uniqueness of the subgame equilibrium
when 0 <P<b , G(t)Ω(t,b) is a continuous and strictly increasing function in (a,b)
or (x,b) where x is ﬁnd by solving Ω(x,b) = 0 when Ω(a,b) < 0.24 Hence, its
24See A.3, especially Step 4 and Equation (21).
36inverse function κ(P) from (0,b)t o( a,b)o r( x,b) is also strictly increasing in (0,b).
Consequently, the certiﬁer can also maximize his proﬁt by optimally choosing the
indiﬀerent type x. The certiﬁcation fee P is then G(x)Ω(x,b). From Proposition 3,
the demand for certiﬁcation service will be 1 − F(x). The product of these two
components give the proﬁt,25
Π(x)=( 1− F(x))G(x)Ω(x,b),x∈ (a,b). (22)
Since the extreme points in Corollary 1 are dominated, the maximum is obtained
inside the interval. The certiﬁer’s best response to the equilibrium strategies of
the seller and the buyers is hence P∗ deﬁned in Equation (6). This, together with
Proposition 3, concludes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Because buyer always bid up to the expected value of a certiﬁed product,
they do not derive positive gains. Social welfare is then the sum of the payoﬀ of the
certiﬁer and the payoﬀ of the seller. Moreover, the sum is exactly what buyers pay
for the product in equilibrium, because this is the only source for the revenues of
both the certiﬁer and the seller.
Since buyers bid zero for a non-certiﬁed product, trading only takes place when the
product has a certiﬁcate. The total surplus is then, for a given certiﬁcation fee, the
result of multiplying buyers’ bid for a certiﬁed product and the probability of the








Taking derivative of this expression gives us,
d





It is then obvious that the right hand side of equation (23) is strictly negative when
κ(P) > 0, strictly positive when κ(P) < 0 and equal to zero when κ(P)=0 .
Maximization of
  b
κ(P) tG(t)dF(t) with a<κ (P) <brequires κ(P)=0 . The welfare
maximizing certiﬁcation fee is hence P∗∗ = G(0)Ω(0,b).
25Note that when Ω(x,b) < 0 when x ∈ (a,x), Π(x) < 0 on this interval too. This allows us to
represent the problem as Equation (22) without explicitly write the case for (x,b).
37A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 5 we show that the certiﬁer can set the indiﬀerent
type x to maximize proﬁt. The ﬁrst order derivative of Π(x)=G(x)Ω(x,b)[1−F(x)]
is
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38This proves the ﬁrst part of Proposition 7. With the additional condition of proﬁt
function concavity, we know the second derivative is negative and the ﬁrst order
condition (25) becomes suﬃcient for proﬁt maximization. However, we are interested
in the value of the ﬁrst derivative (24) at x = 0. When it is larger than 0, the
monopoly certiﬁer will increase P in order to increase x and because of the proﬁt
function concavity the proﬁt maximizing x∗ is larger than 0. Consequently, some
positive types ﬁnd it too expensive to test and the certiﬁcation service is under




























































there is oversupply of certiﬁcation service. So we proved the second part of Propo-
sition 7.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The following is to prove when a<x 2 <x 1 <bsolve the system of equations
(12) and (13), we claim the strategies proﬁle in Proposition 8 constitutes a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. This is done in the following steps.
1. First, for given 0 <P 2 <P 1 <bwhen a<x 2 <x 1 <bsolves
P1 − P2 = G(x1)[ Ω(x1,b) − Ω(x2,x 1)]
P2 = G(x2)Ω(x2,x 1),
we have Ω(x1,b) > Ω(x2,x 1) > 0. This is because G(t) > 0, ∀t>a .
2. Suppose types in [x1,b] choose Certiﬁer 1, types in [x2,x 1) choose Certiﬁer 2
and types in [a,x2) chooses not to test, then buyers expectation for a product
certiﬁed by Certiﬁer 1 µ(C1 | P1,P 2)=E(C1 | P1,P 2)i s Ω ( x1,b) and for a
product certiﬁed by Certiﬁer 2 µ(C2 | P1,P 2)=E(C2 | P1,P 2)i sΩ ( x2,x 1).
Because the prior expectation of the product is negative, the expectation for
a none certiﬁed product µ(NC | P1,P 2) is less than zero.
393. Then buyers bids are β(C1 | P1,P 2)=Ω ( x1,b) for a product certiﬁed by
Certiﬁer 1, β(C2 | P1,P 2)=Ω ( x2,x 1) for a product certiﬁed by Certiﬁer 2 and
0 for a non-certiﬁed product.
4. Since P1 − P2 = G(x1)[ Ω(x1,b) − Ω(x2,x 1)] , P2 = G(x2)Ω(x2,x 1) and G(t)
strictly increases in t, we have for all x1 <t≤ b,
G(t)[ Ω(x1,b) − Ω(x2,x 1)] >P 1 − P2
G(t)Ω(x2,x 1) >P 2
=⇒ G(t)Ω ( x1,b) − P1 >G (t)Ω ( x2,x 1) − P2 > 0;
for all x2 <t<x 1,
G(t)[ Ω(x1,b) − Ω(x2,x 1)] <P 1 − P2
G(t)Ω(x2,x 1) >P 2
=⇒ G(t)Ω ( x2,x 1) − P2 >G (t)Ω ( x1,b) − P1
G(t)Ω ( x2,x 1) − P2 > 0;
for all a ≤ t<x 2,
G(t)[ Ω(x1,b) − Ω(x2,x 1)] <P 1 − P2
G(t)Ω(x2,x 1) <P 2
=⇒ 0 >G (t)Ω ( x2,x 1) >P 2.G(t)Ω ( x1,b) − P1.
Hence we compared the expected payoﬀs for diﬀerent choices for types in [a,b].
Employing also the tie break rule, we conclude that it is true that types in
[x1,b] choose Certiﬁer 1, types in [x2,x 1) choose Certiﬁer 2 and types in [a,x2)
choose not to test.
5. In summary, if there exist such x1,x 2 that satisfy a<x 2 <x 1 <band solve
the system of equations (12) and (13), the above construction proves that the
strategy combinations in Proposition 8 constitute an equilibrium for the given
P1,P 2.
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